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孫 子 兵 法 Sun Zi Introduction Table of content – The Art of War

Chinese strategy explained : know yourself and the ennemy, use deception, spies, and "win with ease". Tr. Giles (en, annotated) and Amiot (fr).

Introduction
I. Laying Plans
II. Waging War
III. Attack by Stratagem
IV. Tactical Dispositions		V. Energy
VI. Weak Points and Strong
VII. Maneuvering
VIII. Variation in Tactics
IX. The Army On The March		X. Terrain
XI. The Nine Situations
XII. The Attack By Fire
XIII. The Use of Spies

行 軍 第 九

The Army On The March

The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.

Sunzi IX. 1.

Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.1

Camp in high places,2 facing the sun.3 Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

1. The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Ch`iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch`iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of valleys."
2. Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding country.
3. Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch`en Hao "facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.

Giles IX.1,2.

Sun Tzu dit : Avant que de faire camper vos troupes, sachez dans quelle position sont les ennemis, mettez-vous au fait du terrain et choisissez ce qu'il y aura de plus avantageux pour vous. On peut réduire à quatre points principaux ces différentes situations.

I. Si vous êtes dans le voisinage de quelque montagne, gardez-vous bien de vous emparer de la partie qui regarde le nord ; occupez au contraire le côté du midi : cet avantage n'est pas d'une petite conséquence. Depuis le penchant de la montagne, étendez-vous en sûreté jusque bien avant dans les vallons ; vous y trouverez de l'eau et du fourrage en abondance ; vous y serez égayé par la vue du soleil, réchauffé par ses rayons, et l'air que vous y respirerez sera tout autrement salubre que celui que vous respireriez de l'autre côté. Si les ennemis viennent par derrière la montagne dans le dessein de vous surprendre, instruit par ceux que vous aurez placé sur la cime, vous vous retirerez à loisir, si vous ne vous croyez pas en état de leur faire tête ; ou vous les attendrez de pied ferme pour les combattre si vous jugez que vous puissiez être vainqueur sans trop risquer. Cependant ne combattez sur les hauteurs que lorsque la nécessité vous y engagera, surtout n'y allez jamais chercher l'ennemi.

Amiot

依谷, not 榖
yves – 2008/12/03

Sunzi IX. 2.

After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.1

When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.2

If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.3

Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.4 Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.5 So much for river warfare.

1. "In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation.
2. Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.
3. For fear of preventing his crossing.
4. See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.
5. Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.

Giles IX.3-6.

II. Si vous êtes auprès de quelque rivière, approchez-vous le plus que vous pourrez de sa source ; tâchez d'en connaître tous les bas-fonds et tous les endroits qu'on peut passer à gué. Si vous avez à la passer, ne le faites jamais en présence de l'ennemi ; mais si les ennemis, plus hardis, ou moins prudents que vous, veulent en hasarder le passage, ne les attaquez point que la moitié de leurs gens ne soit de l'autre côté ; vous combattrez alors avec tout l'avantage de deux contre un. Près des rivières mêmes tenez toujours les hauteurs, afin de pouvoir découvrir au loin ; n'attendez pas l'ennemi près des bords, n'allez pas au-devant de lui ; soyez toujours sur vos gardes de peur qu'étant surpris vous n'ayez pas un lieu pour vous retirer en cas de malheur.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 3.

In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.1

If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.2 So much for operations in salt-marches.

1. Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.
2. Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.

Giles IX.7,8.

III. Si vous êtes dans des lieux glissants, humides, marécageux et malsains, sortez-en le plus vite que vous pourrez ; vous ne sauriez vous y arrêter sans être exposé aux plus grands inconvénients ; la disette des vivres et les maladies viendraient bientôt vous y assiéger. Si vous êtes contraint d'y rester, tâchez d'en occuper les bords ; gardez-vous bien d'aller trop avant. S'il y a des forêts aux environs, laissez-les derrière vous.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 4.

In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,1 so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.

1. Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."

Giles IX.9.

IV. Si vous êtes en plaine dans des lieux unis et secs, ayez toujours votre gauche à découvert ; ménagez derrière vous quelque élévation d'où vos gens puissent découvrir au loin. Quand le devant de votre camp ne vous présentera que des objets de mort, ayez soin que les lieux qui sont derrière puissent vous offrir des secours contre l'extrême nécessité.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 5.

These are the four useful branches of military knowledge1 which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.2

1. Those, namely, concerned with 1) mountains, 2) rivers, 3) marshes, and 4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. 1.
2. Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch`en asks, with some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU T`AO it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the Empire." Ts`ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.

Giles IX.10.

Tels sont les avantages des différents campements ; avantages précieux, d'où dépend la plus grande partie des succès militaires. C'est en particulier parce qu'il possédait à fond l'art des campements que l'Empereur Jaune triompha de ses ennemis et soumit à ses lois tous les princes voisins de ses États

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 6.

All armies prefer high ground to low,1 and sunny places to dark.

If you are careful of your men,2 and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,3 and this will spell victory.

1. "High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not only more agreement and salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fighting."
2. Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn out your animals to graze."
3. Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of illness."

Giles IX.11,12.

Il faut conclure de tout ce que je viens de dire que les hauteurs sont en général plus salutaires aux troupes que les lieux bas et profonds. Dans les lieux élevés mêmes, il y a un choix à faire : c'est de camper toujours du côté du midi, parce que c'est là qu'on trouve l'abondance et la fertilité. Un campement de cette nature est un avant-coureur de la victoire. Le contentement et la santé, qui sont la suite ordinaire d'une bonne nourriture prise sous un ciel pur, donnent du courage et de la force au soldat, tandis que la tristesse, le mécontentement et les maladies l'épuisent, l'énervent, le rendent pusillanime et le découragent entièrement.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 7.

When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.

Giles IX.13.

Il faut conclure encore que les campements près des rivières ont leurs avantages qu'il ne faut pas négliger, et leurs inconvénients qu'il faut tâcher d'éviter avec un grand soin. Je ne saurais trop vous le répéter, tenez le haut de la rivière, laissez-en le courant aux ennemis. Outre que les gués sont beaucoup plus fréquents vers la source, les eaux en sont plus pures et plus salubres.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 8.

When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

Giles IX.14.

Lorsque les pluies auront formé quelque torrent, ou qu'elles auront grossi le fleuve ou la rivière dont vous occupez les bords, attendez quelque temps avant que de vous mettre en marche. Surtout ne vous hasardez pas à passer de l'autre côté, attendez pour le faire que les eaux aient repris la tranquillité de leur cours ordinaire. Vous en aurez des preuves certaines si vous n'entendez plus un certain bruit sourd, qui tient plus du frémissement que du murmure, si vous ne voyez plus d'écume surnager, et si la terre ou le sable ne coulent plus avec l'eau.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 9.

Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,1 confined places,2 tangled thickets,3 quagmires4 and crevasses,5 should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

1. The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.
2. Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by precipices on three sides–easy to get into, but hard to get out of."
3. Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be used."
4. Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable for chariots and horsemen."
5. Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses.

Giles IX.15.

Pour ce qui est des défilés et des lieux entrecoupés par des précipices et par des rochers, des lieux marécageux et glissants, des lieux étroits et couverts, lorsque la nécessité ou le hasard vous y aura conduit, tirez-vous-en le plus tôt qu'il vous sera possible, éloignez-vous-en le plus tôt que vous pourrez.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 10.

While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

Giles IX.16.

Si vous en êtes loin, l'ennemi en sera près. Si vous fuyez, l'ennemi poursuivra et tombera peut-être dans les dangers que vous venez d'éviter.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 11.

If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.1

When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.2

When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance.3

If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.

1. Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."
2. Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."
3. Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding to the challenge."

Giles IX.17-20.

Vous devez encore être extrêmement en garde contre une autre espèce de terrain. Il est des lieux couverts de broussailles ou de petits bois ; il en est qui sont pleins de hauts et de bas, où l'on est sans cesse ou sur des collines ou dans des vallons, défiez-vous-en ; soyez dans une attention continuelle. Ces sortes de lieux peuvent être pleins d'embuscades ; l'ennemi peut sortir à chaque instant vous surprendre, tomber sur vous et vous tailler en pièces. Si vous en êtes loin, n'en approchez pas ; si vous en êtes près, ne vous mettez pas en mouvement que vous n'ayez fait reconnaître tous les environs. Si l'ennemi vient vous y attaquer, faites en sorte qu'il ait tout le désavantage du terrain de son côté. Pour vous, ne l'attaquez que lorsque vous le verrez à découvert.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 12.

Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.1 The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.2

The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.3 Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

1. Ts`ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's march."
2. Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao Kung's, is as follows: "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come across.
3. Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."

Giles IX.21,22.

Quel que soit le lieu de votre campement, bon ou mauvais, il faut que vous en tiriez parti ; n'y soyez jamais oisif, ni sans faire quelque tentative ; éclairez toutes les démarches des ennemis ; ayez des espions de distance en distance, jusqu'au milieu de leur camp, jusque sous la tente de leur général. Ne négligez rien de tout ce qu'on pourra vous rapporter, faites attention à tout.

Si ceux de vos gens que vous avez envoyés à la découverte vous font dire que les arbres sont en mouvement, quoique par un temps calme, concluez que l'ennemi est en marche. Il peut se faire qu'il veuille venir à vous ; disposez toutes choses, préparez-vous à le bien recevoir, allez même au-devant de lui.

Si l'on vous rapporte que les champs sont couverts d'herbes, et que ces herbes sont fort hautes, tenez-vous sans cesse sur vos gardes ; veillez continuellement, de peur de quelque surprise.

Si l'on vous dit qu'on a vu des oiseaux attroupés voler par bandes sans s'arrêter, soyez en défiance ; on vient vous espionner ou vous tendre des pièges ; mais si, outre les oiseaux, on voit encore un grand nombre de quadrupèdes courir la campagne, comme s'ils n'avaient point de gîte, c'est une marque que les ennemis sont aux aguets.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 13.

When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.1 When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.2

1. "High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc." ["Aids to Scouting," p. 26.]
2. Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a cantonment, light horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its motion."

Giles IX.23.

Si l'on vous rapporte qu'on aperçoit au loin des tourbillons de poussière s'élever dans les airs, concluez que les ennemis sont en marche. Dans les endroits où la poussière est basse et épaisse sont les gens de pied ; dans les endroits où elle est moins épaisse et plus élevée sont la cavalerie et les chars. Si l'on vous avertit que les ennemis sont dispersés et ne marchent que par pelotons, c'est une marque qu'ils ont eu à traverser quelque bois, qu'ils ont fait des abattis, et qu'ils sont fatigués ; ils cherchent alors à se rassembler. Si vous apprenez qu'on aperçoit dans les campagnes des gens de pied et des hommes à cheval aller et venir, dispersés çà et là par petites bandes, ne doutez pas que les ennemis ne soient campés. Tels sont les indices généraux dont vous devez tâcher de profiter, tant pour savoir la position de ceux avec lesquels vous devez vous mesurer que pour faire avorter leurs projets, et vous mettre à couvert de toute surprise de leur part. En voici quelques autres auxquels vous devez une plus particulière attention.

Amiot

Sunzi IX. 14.

Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance.1 Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat.

1. "As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T`ien Tan of the Ch`i-mo against the Yen forces, led by Ch`i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read: "T`ien Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch`i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.' The other side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T`ien Tan sent back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself too a mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T`ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would allow their homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch`i Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch`i Chien... The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch`i State."

Giles IX.24.

Lorsque ceux de vos espions qui sont près du camp des ennemis vous feront savoir qu'on y parle bas et d'une manière mystérieuse, que ces ennemis sont modestes dans leur façon d'agir et retenus dans tous leurs discours, concluez qu'ils pensent à une action générale, et qu'ils en font déjà les préparatifs. Allez à eux sans perdre de temps. Ils veulent vous surprendre, surprenez-les vous-même. Si vous apprenez au contraire qu'ils sont bruyants, fiers et hautains dans leurs discours, soyez certain qu'ils pensent à la retraite et qu'ils n'ont nullement envie d'en v