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Sun Zi Introduction Table of content – The Art of War

Chinese strategy explained : know yourself and the ennemy, use deception, spies, and "win with ease". Tr. Giles (en, annotated) and Amiot (fr).

Sunzi XIII. 1.

Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.1 There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.2 As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor.3

1. Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.
2. Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in plunder.' Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?–The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."
3. Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough- tail." The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able- bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.

Giles XIII.1.

Sun Tzu dit : Si, ayant sur pied une armée de cent mille hommes, vous devez la conduire jusqu'à la distance de cent lieues, il faut compter qu'au-dehors, comme au-dedans, tout sera en mouvement et en rumeur. Les villes et les villages dont vous aurez tiré les hommes qui composent vos troupes ; les hameaux et les campagnes dont vous aurez tiré vos provisions et tout l'attirail de ceux qui doivent les conduire ; les chemins remplis de gens qui vont et viennent, tout cela ne saurait arriver qu'il n'y ait bien des familles dans la désolation, bien des terres incultes, et bien des dépenses pour État. Sept cent mille familles dépourvues de leurs chefs ou de leurs soutiens se trouvent tout à coup hors d'état de vaquer à leurs travaux ordinaires. Les terres privées d'un pareil nombre de ceux qui les faisaient valoir diminuent, en proportion des soins qu'on leur refuse, la quantité comme la qualité de leurs productions. Les appointements de tant d'officiers, la paie journalière de tant de soldats et l'entretien de tout le monde creusent peu à peu les greniers et les coffres du prince comme ceux du peuple, et ne sauraient manquer de les épuiser bientôt.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 2.

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments,1 is the height of inhumanity.2

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.3

1. "For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.
2. Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity.
3. This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch`u State: "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess' is made up of [the characters for] 'to stay' and 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."

Giles XIII.2,3.

Être plusieurs années à observer ses ennemis, ou à faire la guerre, c'est ne point aimer le peuple, c'est être l'ennemi de son pays ; toutes les dépenses, toutes les peines, tous les travaux et toutes les fatigues de plusieurs années n'aboutissent le plus souvent, pour les vainqueurs eux-mêmes, qu'à une journée de triomphe et de gloire, celle où ils ont vaincu. N'employer pour vaincre que la voie des sièges et des batailles, c'est ignorer également et les devoirs de souverain et ceux de général ; c'est ne pas savoir gouverner ; c'est ne pas savoir servir État

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 3.

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.1

1. That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to do.

Giles XIII.4.

Ainsi, le dessein de faire la guerre une fois formé, les troupes étant déjà sur pied et en état de tout entreprendre, ne dédaignez pas d'employer les artifices. Commencez par vous mettre au fait de tout ce qui concerne les ennemis. Sachez exactement tous les rapports qu'ils peuvent avoir, leurs liaisons et leurs intérêts réciproques ; n'épargnez pas les grandes sommes d'argent ; n'ayez pas plus de regret à celui que vous ferez passer chez l'étranger, soit pour vous faire des créatures, soit pour vous procurer des connaissances exactes, qu'à celui que vous emploierez pour la paie de ceux qui sont enrôlés sous vos étendards : plus vous dépenserez, plus vous gagnerez ; c'est un argent que vous placez pour en retirer un gros intérêt. Ayez des espions partout, soyez instruit de tout, ne négligez rien de ce que vous pourrez apprendre ; mais, quand vous aurez appris quelque chose, ne la confiez pas indiscrètement à tous ceux qui vous approchent.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 4.

Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,1 nor by any deductive calculation.2

Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.3

1. Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous cases."
2. Li Ch`uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."
3. Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."

Giles XIII.5,6.

Lorsque vous emploierez quelque artifice, ce n'est pas en invoquant les Esprits, ni en prévoyant à peu près ce qui doit ou peut arriver, que vous le ferez réussir ; c'est uniquement en sachant sûrement, par le rapport fidèle de ceux dont vous vous servirez, la disposition des ennemis, eu égard à ce que vous voulez qu'ils fassent. Quand un habile général se met en mouvement, l'ennemi est déjà vaincu : quand il combat, il doit faire lui seul plus que toute son armée ensemble ; non pas toutefois par la force de son bras, mais par sa prudence, par sa manière de commander, et surtout par ses ruses. Il faut qu'au premier signal une partie de l'armée ennemie se range de son côté pour combattre sous ses étendards : il faut qu'il soit toujours le maître d'accorder la paix et de l'accorder aux conditions qu'il jugera à propos.

Amiot

jkioo, uirza
sxcfgh – 2008/12/04

Sunzi XIII. 5.

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: 1) Local spies; 2) inward spies; 3) converted spies; 4) doomed spies; 5) surviving spies.

Giles XIII.7.

Le grand secret de venir à bout de tout consiste dans l'art de savoir mettre la division à propos ; division dans les villes et les villages, division extérieure, division entre les inférieurs et les supérieurs, division de mort, division de vie.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 6.

When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.1

1. Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves thus gained." ["Aids to Scouting," p. 2.]

Giles XIII.8.

Ces cinq sortes de divisions ne sont que les branches d'un même tronc. Celui qui sait les mettre en usage est un homme véritablement digne de commander ; c'est le trésor de son souverain et le soutien de l'empire.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 7.

Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.1

1. Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind treatment, and use them as spies."

Giles XIII.9.

J'appelle division dans les villes et les villages celle par laquelle on trouve le moyen de détacher du parti ennemi les habitants des villes et des villages qui sont de sa domination, et de se les attacher de manière à pouvoir s'en servir sûrement dans le besoin.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 8.

Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the enemy.1

1. Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P`i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to attack at P`o-t`ai's bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march; and P`o-t`ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.

Giles XIII.10.

J'appelle division extérieure celle par laquelle on trouve le moyen d'avoir à son service les officiers qui servent actuellement dans l'armée ennemie.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 9.

Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.1

1. By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success: 1) by T`ien Tan in his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); 2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P`o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch`in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P`o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which causes Ch`in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P`o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P`o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and the great military power of Ch`in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword.

Giles XIII.11.

Par la division entre les inférieurs et les supérieurs, j'entends celle qui nous met en état de profiter de la mésintelligence que nous aurons su mettre entre alliés, entre les différents corps, ou entre les officiers de divers grades qui composent l'armée que nous aurons à combattre.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 10.

Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.1

1. Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch`ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T`ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T`ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T`ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch`i. He has certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch`i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.

Giles XIII.12.

La division de mort est celle par laquelle, après avoir fait donner de faux avis sur l'état où nous nous trouvons, nous faisons courir des bruits tendancieux, lesquels nous faisons passer jusqu'à la cour de son souverain, qui, les croyant vrais, se conduit en conséquence envers ses généraux et tous les officiers qui sont actuellement à son service.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 11.

SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.1

1. This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T`ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."

Giles XIII.13.

La division de vie est celle par laquelle on répand l'argent à pleines mains envers tous ceux qui, ayant quitté le service de leur légitime maître, ont passé de votre côté, ou pour combattre sous vos étendards, ou pour vous rendre d'autres services non moins essentiels.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 12.

Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.1 None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.2

Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.3

They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.4

Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.5

1. Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the spy is privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.
2. Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. ["Marshal Turenne," p. 311.]
3. Mei Yao-ch`en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experience and skill." But he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage."
4. Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their might."
5. Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy."

Giles XIII.14-17.

Si vous avez su vous faire des créatures dans les villes et les villages des ennemis, vous ne manquerez pas d'y avoir bientôt quantité de gens qui vous seront entièrement dévoués. Vous saurez par leur moyen les dispositions du grand nombre des leurs à votre égard, ils vous suggéreront la manière et les moyens que vous devez employer pour gagner ceux de leurs compatriotes dont vous aurez le plus à craindre ; et quand le temps de faire des sièges sera venu, vous pourrez faire des conquêtes, sans être obligé de monter à l'assaut, sans coup férir, sans même tirer l'épée.

Si les ennemis qui sont actuellement occupés à vous faire la guerre ont à leur service des officiers qui ne sont pas d'accord entre eux ; si de mutuels soupçons, de petites jalousies, des intérêts personnels les tiennent divisés, vous trouverez aisément les moyens d'en détacher une partie, car quelque vertueux qu'ils puissent être d'ailleurs, quelque dévoués qu'ils soient à leur souverain, l'appât de la vengeance, celui des richesses ou des postes éminents que vous leur promettez, suffiront amplement pour les gagner ; et quand une fois ces passions seront allumées dans leur cœur, il n'est rien qu'ils ne tenteront pour les satisfaire.

Si les différents corps qui composent l'armée des ennemis ne se soutiennent pas entre eux, s'ils sont occupés à s'observer mutuellement, s'ils cherchent réciproquement à se nuire, il vous sera aisé d'entretenir leur mésintelligence, de fomenter leurs divisions ; vous les détruirez peu à peu les uns par les autres, sans qu'il soit besoin qu'aucun d'eux se déclare ouvertement pour votre parti ; tous vous serviront sans le vouloir, même sans le savoir.

Si vous avez fait courir des bruits, tant pour persuader ce que vous voulez qu'on croie de vous, que sur les fausses démarches que vous supposerez avoir été faites par les généraux ennemis ; si vous avez fait passer de faux avis jusqu'à la cour et au conseil même du prince contre les intérêts duquel vous avez à combattre ; si vous avez su faire douter des bonnes intentions de ceux mêmes dont la fidélité à leur prince vous sera la plus connue, bientôt vous verrez que chez les ennemis les soupçons ont pris la place de la confiance, que les récompenses ont été substituées aux châtiments et les châtiments aux récompenses, que les plus légers indices tiendront lieu des preuves les plus convaincantes pour faire périr quiconque sera soupçonné.

Alors les meilleurs officiers, leurs ministres les plus éclairés se dégoûteront, leur zèle se ralentira ; et se voyant sans espérance d'un meilleur sort, ils se réfugieront chez vous pour se délivrer des justes craintes dont ils étaient perpétuellement agités, et pour mettre leurs jours à couvert. Leurs parents, leurs alliés ou leurs amis seront accusés, recherchés, mis à mort. Les complots se formeront, l'ambition se réveillera, ce ne seront plus que perfidies, que cruelles exécutions, que désordres, que révoltes de tous côtés. Que vous restera-t-il à faire pour vous rendre maître d'un pays dont les peuples voudraient déjà vous voir en possession ?

Si vous récompensez ceux qui se seront donnés à vous pour se délivrer des justes craintes dont ils étaient perpétuellement agités, et pour mettre leurs jours à couvert ; si vous leur donnez de l'emploi, leurs parents, leurs alliés, leur amis seront autant de sujets que vous acquerrez à votre prince. Si vous répandez l'argent à pleines mains, si vous traitez bien tout le monde, si vous empêchez que vos soldats ne fassent le moindre dégât dans les endroits par où ils passeront, si les peuples vaincus ne souffrent aucun dommage, assurez-vous qu'ils sont déjà gagnés, et que le bien qu'ils diront de vous attirera plus de sujets à votre maître et plus de villes sous sa domination que les plus brillantes victoires.

Soyez vigilant et éclairé ; mais montrez à l'extérieur beaucoup de sécurité, de simplicité et même d'indifférence ; soyez toujours sur vos gardes, quoique vous paraissiez ne penser à rien ; défiez-vous de tout, quoique vous paraissiez sans défiance ; soyez extrêmement secret, quoiqu'il paraisse que vous ne fassiez rien qu'à découvert ; ayez des espions partout ; au lieu de paroles, servez-vous de signaux ; voyez par la bouche, parlez par les yeux ; cela n'est pas aisé, cela est très difficile. On est quelquefois trompé lorsqu'on croit tromper les autres.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 13.

Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.1

1. Cf. VI. ss. 9.

Giles XIII.18.

Il n'y a qu'un homme d'une prudence consommée, qu'un homme extrêmement éclairé, qu'un sage du premier ordre qui puisse employer à propos et avec succès l'artifice des divisions. Si vous n'êtes point tel, vous devez y renoncer ; l'usage que vous en feriez ne tournerait qu'à votre détriment.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 14.

If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.1

1. Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's main point in this passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as Ch`en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."

Giles XIII.19.

Après avoir enfanté quelque projet, si vous apprenez que votre secret a transpiré, faites mourir sans rémission tant ceux qui l'auront divulgué que ceux à la connaissance desquels il sera parvenu. Ceux-ci ne sont point coupables encore à la vérité, mais ils pourraient le devenir. Leur mort sauvera la vie à quelques milliers d'hommes et assurera la fidélité d'un plus grand nombre encore.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 15.

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp,1 and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.2

1. Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.
2. As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important functionaries can be won over by bribery.

Giles XIII.20.

Punissez sévèrement, récompensez avec largesse : multipliez les espions, ayez-en partout, dans le propre palais du prince ennemi, dans l'hôtel de ses ministres, sous les tentes de ses généraux ; ayez une liste des principaux officiers qui sont à son service ; sachez leurs noms, leurs surnoms, le nombre de leurs enfants, de leurs parents, de leurs amis, de leurs domestiques ; que rien ne se passe chez eux que vous n'en soyez instruit.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 16.

The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service.

It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.1

It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.2

Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.

1. Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn the enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to corruption."
2. Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be deceived."

Giles XIII.21-24.

Vous aurez vos espions partout : vous devez supposer que l'ennemi aura aussi les siens. Si vous venez à les découvrir, gardez-vous bien de les faire mettre à mort ; leurs jours doivent vous être infiniment précieux. Les espions des ennemis vous serviront efficacement, si vous mesurez tellement vos démarches, vos paroles et toutes vos actions, qu'ils ne puissent jamais donner que de faux avis à ceux qui les ont envoyés.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 17.

The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.1 Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.

1. As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.

Giles XIII.25.

Enfin, un bon général doit tirer parti de tout ; il ne doit être surpris de rien, quoi que ce soit qui puisse arriver. Mais par-dessus tout, et de préférence à tout, il doit mettre en pratique ces cinq sortes de divisions. Rien n'est impossible à qui sait s'en servir. Défendre les États de son souverain, les agrandir, faire chaque jour de nouvelles conquêtes, exterminer les ennemis, fonder même de nouvelles dynasties, tout cela peut n'être que l'effet des dissensions employées à propos.

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 18.

Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty1 who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya2 who had served under the Yin.3

1. Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was changed to Yin by P`an Keng in 1401. was due to I Chih, better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part in Ch`eng T`ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.
2. Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T`ai Kung, a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified with the LIU T`AO.
3. There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch`en appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.

Giles XIII.26.

Telle fut la voie qui permit l'avènement des dynasties Yin et Tcheou, lorsque des serviteurs transfuges contribuèrent à leur élévation. Quel est celui de nos livres qui ne fait l'éloge de ces grands ministres ! L'Histoire leur a-t-elle jamais donné les noms de traîtres à leur patrie, ou de rebelles à leur souverain ?

Amiot

Sunzi XIII. 19.

Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.1 Spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move.2

1. Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."
2. Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with ears or eyes.

Giles XIII.27.

Seul le prince éclairé et le digne général peuvent gagner à leur service les esprits les plus pénétrants et accomplir de vastes desseins. Une armée sans agents secrets est un homme sans yeux ni oreilles.

Amiot

Chinese landscape on plate (59)

The Art of War – Sun Zi XIII – Chinese off/onFrançais/English
Alias Sun Tzu, Sun Wu, Sun Tse, Sunzi Bingfa, Souen Tseu, Souen Wou, 孫武.

The Book of Odes, The Analects, Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Three-characters book, The Book of Changes, The Way and its Power, 300 Tang Poems, The Art of War, Thirty-Six Strategies
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