孫 子 兵 法 Sun Zi – L'Art de la guerre

La stratégie chinoise ou comment s'informer, estimer, diviser, détourner, tromper, et vaincre « sans coup férir ». Tr. Amiot (fr) et Giles (en).

Introduction
I. De l'évaluation
II. De l'engagement
III. Des propositions de la victoire et de la défaite
IV. De la mesure dans la disposition des moyens
V. De la contenance
VI. Du plein et du vide

VII. De l'affrontement direct et indirect
VIII. Des neuf changements
IX. De la distribution des moyens
X. De la topologie
XI. Des neufs sortes de terrain
XII. De l'art d'attaquer par le feu
XIII. De la concorde et de la discorde

九地第十一

Des neufs sortes de terrain

Sunzi XI. 27.


故善用兵者攜手若使一人不得已也	政之道也剛柔皆得地之理也	是故方馬埋輪未足恃也齊勇如一

Dans quelque position que vous puissiez être, si votre armée est inférieure à celle des ennemis, votre seule conduite, si elle est bonne, peut la rendre victorieuse. Il n'est pas suffisant de compter sur les chevaux boiteux ou les chariots embourbés, mais à quoi vous servirait d'être placé avantageusement si vous ne saviez pas tirer parti de votre position ? À quoi servent la bravoure sans la prudence, la valeur sans la ruse ?

Amiot

Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground1

The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.2

How to make the best of both strong and weak–that is a question involving the proper use of ground.3

Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.4

1. These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the SHUAI-JAN.

2. Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important particular–unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.

3. Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions... and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features." ["The Science of War," p. 333.]

4. Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it."

Giles XI.31-34.

Sun Zi XI. 27.